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Beyond Cosmopolitanism and
Nationalism: Diasporic Chinese
and Neo-Nationalism in
China and Thailand
William A+ Callahan
It is now popular to see globalization as the spread of a homogeneous political
economy that challenges the legitimacy and efficacy of the nation-state+ This po-
litical economy is attended by a cultural hegemony characterized as Westerniza-
tion or Americanization+ But resistance to such globalization is not limited to a
reassertion of the boundaries of the nation-state or protest actions by cosmopoli-
tan social movements+ Another group of texts points to diasporic Chinese net-
works as an authentically Asian form of globalization+ The Chinese diaspora is
said to have its own highly successful “culture of capitalism+” Rather than point-
ing to a global political economy, many now talk of a distinct Chinese modernity
that has its own unique economic culture+1
Though diasporas are hailed as postnational groups who challenge both state
sovereignty and global capitalism,2 overseas Chinese identity itself has been rad-
ically unstable for the past 150 years+ Beyond simple hyphenations such as Sino-
Thai and Chinese-American, the diaspora was called “domestic overseas Chinese”
in imperial China, “foreign Orientals” in the Dutch East Indies, “artificial Chi-
nese” and “noble-ized Chinese” in Thailand, and since the 1980s, “pseudo-Chinese”
This research was funded by a generous grant from the British Academy ~South-East Asia Commit-
tee! and was facilitated by the hospitality of Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for East Asian Re-
search, the University of Hong Kong’s Centre of Asian Studies, and the University of Mahasarakham+
I would like to thank Sumalee Bumroongsook and Teera Vorrakitpokatorn for their research assistance+
I have received helpful comments from IO’s editors and reviewers, Mark Aspinwall, Chaiwat Satha-
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in the People’s Republic of China ~PRC!+3 Though the overseas Chinese network
is seen as an “invisible empire” that “knows no borders,” 4 I look to the Sino-Thai
experience to see how diasporic Chinese have been involved in defining borders:
provincial, national, and transnational+
This article argues two interrelated points, both of which highlight the dynamic
interaction between Chinese, Thai, and Sino-Thai identity construction, and the
mutual production of domestic and international politics—not just according to
shared norms, but in relations of difference+ First, I show how neo-nationalism in
China and Thailand share the same logic and images: both have used diasporic
Chinese as a resource to construct a nationalist self and a foreign Other+ Second,
the article questions how “nationalism” and “cosmopolitanism” are formulated by
arguing against the popular notion of diasporic Chinese as a cosmopolitan com-
munity+ A series of ethnographies of overseas Chinese in Thailand examines the
diversity of ‘Chineseness’—as it is articulated in different economic-cultural
spaces—to develop a more nuanced understanding of the relations between dias-
pora, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism+ Rather than assimilating or separating
themselves from mainstream life, the evidence shows that Sino-Thai communities
tend to colonize identity formation in the various local economic cultures, both
responding to and developing the prevailing economic context+ In Bangkok, they
are national nodes for international activity+ In coastal Phuket, they are transna-
tional nodes for regional activity+ In rural Mahasarakham, they are provincial cen-
ters for mercantile capitalism+ I argue that a sociological approach that examines
national identity in terms of norms and institutions would have missed this
economic-cultural dynamic+
The third argument of this article is thus theoretical+ One conclusion would be
that the diversity of diasporic economic cultures among Sino-Thai populations
evades generalization in a curious combination of empiricism ~theory is unneces-
sary because the facts speak for themselves! and relativism ~deconstruction shows
that anything goes!+ This article argues that generalizations are possible, but one
has to look in different places for a new set of problems and solutions+ To under-
stand how nationalism and cosmopolitanism, the global and the local work, one
needs to see how the outsiders—in this case, the diaspora—are necessary for con-
structing communities and producing boundaries+ Diasporas thus are not just an
economic resource for home and host countries, but are a symbolic resource in the
production of cosmopolitanism, nationalism, and localism+
To argue this, I supplement the sociological turn of constructivism that uses
identity and norms to fill the cultural gap left by rationalistic international rela-
3+ See Wang 1991 and 1992, 1–10; Reid 1997, 33; Anderson 1991, 122–23; and Kasian 1992, 108+
The more common terms for this group—“overseas Chinese” and “diasporic Chinese”—are also prob-
lematic ~see discussion below!+ Unless otherwise noted, in this article I use them interchangeably to
refer to ethnic Chinese populations who reside outside of the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong+
4+ See Seagrave 1995; Andrew Tanzer, “Overseas China: The Giant Economy That Knows No Bor-
ders,” Forbes, 18 July 1994, 138+
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tions ~IR! theory+ A sociological approach, for example, might look for common
norms of “Asian values” to explain the commonalities shared by Chinese and Thai
neo-nationalism+ But rather than looking to culture as a substance that has con-
tent, anthropological constructivism highlights how culture takes shape in context-
sensitive relations between identity and difference+ The analysis of diasporic Chinese
politics shows that what China and Thailand share is not a common normative
identity, but a common set of differences against which their particular national
identities are constructed+ By shifting the research agenda from norms to differ-
ence, anthropological constructivism is better able to consolidate sociological con-
structivism’s anti-essentialist view of identity and account for transnational politics+
Moreover, this article adds to critical notions of diaspora politics—which often
bypass the nation-state by jumping from local to global—by figuring the nation
back into the local0global dynamic+
These arguments do not, I argue, apply just to an “exotic” Chinese case+ Be-
cause identities are produced by relations of exclusion in specific contexts, to un-
derstand other neo-nationalism, one needs to look at how they are formed by other
diasporas+ It is necessary to see how the Islamic diaspora in Europe, for example,
has recently sparked neo-nationalism in France, England, the Netherlands, and so
on+ But as this article’s empirical evidence shows, diasporas are not simply an
“ethnic problem” that states need to solve through policies of assimilation or multi-
culturalism+ The relations between national identity and diasporas are key to the
construction and deconstruction of the seemingly opposite ideologies of national-
ism and cosmopolitanism+ This ethnographic approach encourages one to look in
different places for world politics, shifting away from state actors to transnational
nonstate actors, from geopolitics and international political economy ~IPE! to eco-
nomic culture, and from law and institutions as the foundations of international
society to the less formal organizations of diasporic public spheres+ Diaspora thus
not only adds new data to arguments about global0local relations—it helps one
question the structures of world politics that look to the opposition between cos-
mopolitanism and nationalism+ Hence “think@ing# of ourselves beyond the na-
tion” 5 is not enough; we also have to think of ourselves beyond the cosmopolitan+
The first section of this article examines in more detail the theoretical issues
just raised to argue for an anthropological constructivism to supplement sociolog-
ical constructivism+ The next two sections analyze essential notions of nation-
state and diaspora to show how overseas Chinese have been crucial in the production
of Chinese and Thai nationalism+ The second section thus shows how overseas
Chinese are used not just as a financial resource in China to fund revolutions in
the past and economic reforms in the present; they have been an important sym-
bolic resource in the construction of Chinese nationalism+ The third section exam-
ines how diasporic Chinese have been crucial in the construction of Thai national
5+ Appadurai 1996, 158+
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identity, first as the foreign Other, and more recently as promoters of a more in-
clusive Thai neo-nationalism+
The fourth section highlights how the diaspora uses the same logic of the rela-
tions of difference to form a set of new communities and thus new borders in
Thailand+ Though they may seem national, one should be clear that these borders
are not the juridical-legal territorial borders of the nation-state+ They are the eco-
nomic and cultural borders of various communities in the national center of Bang-
kok, the transnational node of Phuket, and the rural Mahasarakham province+ The
ethnographies from these three sites show how diasporic Chinese flexibly respond
to political, economic, and cultural opportunities in these contexts, and thus are
key elements in the construction of a set of social and economic borders+ In this
way it encourages one to see identity formation not just in terms of shared norms,
but also as the product of borders that are generated in relations of exclusion+
These new borders are not simply symbolic constructions; the fourth section shows
how Sino-Thai communities are supported by the informal organizations and net-
works of a diasporic public sphere+ The article thus highlights both the dynamic
interaction between Chinese, Thai, and Sino-Thai identity construction, and the
mutual production of cosmopolitan and national politics+
Theoretical Context
Before questioning the relation of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, it is impor-
tant to clarify the meanings of diaspora, anthropological constructivism, and eco-
nomic culture+ Diaspora has received much attention in recent years in the
humanities and anthropology as a way of understanding the complexities of glob-
alization and transnationalism+6 Because diasporas—almost by definition—lack po-
litical status, they also present epistemological and ontological problems for IR
theory that is regulated by states and international regimes+7 Yet most diaspora
research still begins and ends with a comparative examination of national identity+
To understand Sino-Thai identity, for example, the two national cultures are re-
lated according to the distinction of assimilation0multiculturalism to ask whether
the “Chinese identity” has been assimilated into Thai culture—or not+ Diasporic
Chinese are studied as an “ethnic problem” in the new states of postcolonial South-
east Asia; similar to many Jewish communities in Europe, diasporic Chinese have
been criticized as a pariah entrepreneur group that profited from European impe-
rial regimes+ Politics is reduced to questions of the loyalty of these “essential out-
siders” to their Chinese homeland or their adopted nation+ Seen in this way,
“Nationalism involves fixing fluid identities, refashioning their representations, and
rigidifying the perception of boundaries between the self and the Other+” 8 Sino-
6+ See Clifford 1994; Ong 1999; Cheah and Robbins 1998; and Appadurai 1996+
7+ Lavie and Swedenburg 1996, 15+
8+ Duara 1997, 56+
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Thai history thus is not autonomous, but is absorbed into the national historiogra-
phy of either China or Thailand+9
Critical studies of diaspora challenge any natural linkage between nation and
state by arguing that cosmopolitan ethnic communities should be defined by nei-
ther countries of origin nor host countries+ Nonini and Ong, for example, argue
that diasporic Chinese have their own “third culture” that is neither purely Chi-
nese nor essentially Thai, but mobile: “different ways of being Chinese are not
based on the possession of reified Chinese culture, but on the propensity to seek
opportunities elsewhere+” 10 This critical examination of diaspora and cosmo-
politanism has highlighted the intimate and specific linkages between the global
and the local as well as the interplay of gender, class, and ethnicity+11 As Wang
Gungwu—the dean of overseas Chinese studies—argues, the diaspora is no longer
tied to China but is engaged in a “quest for autonomy+” 12
But the response of diasporic Chinese to the rape and murder of ethnic Chinese
in Indonesia in 1998 makes one question such a clear distinction between cosmo-
politanism and nationalism+ Many of the diasporic Chinese Web sites that now
serve as networks for a cosmopolitan community—for example, the World Hua-
ren @Chinese# Federation’s Web site13—were initially organized as a response to
the Indonesian anti-Chinese atrocities+ These diasporic cyber-networks also inter-
acted with mainland Chinese cyber–bulletin boards to pressure the Chinese gov-
ernment in Beijing to respond more forcefully to these events+14 Hence cosmopolitan
networks are here used for nationalist issues, in an interplay of influence: while
elite diasporic cosmopolitans ~in Southeast Asia, Australia, and North America!
were providing information to pressure the Chinese state, elite mainland Chinese
nationals were pressuring the same government in support of diasporic Chinese
~in Indonesia!+ Rather than global civil society—which uses universal rights to
argue for justice—these groups spoke in terms of Chinese ethnicity in a diasporic
public sphere+ Thus cosmopolitanism, nationalism, and diaspora are mutually pro-
duced first in cyberspace and then in government pronouncements—cyber-
campaigns from both inside and outside the PRC pushed Beijing to depart from
its policy of diplomatic noninterference to condemn the Indonesian government+
In this article, I argue that such examples show how singular notions of identity—
either for nation-states or for diaspora as an autonomous third culture—are not
helpful in explaining transnational politics+ I question how nationalism and cos-
mopolitanism are formulated by arguing against the increasingly popular notion
9+ See Chirot and Reid 1997; Skinner 1957; Kasian 1992; Cao 1999, 3; and McKeown 1999, 312+
10+ See Nonini and Ong 1997, 11, 26; see also Ong 1999, 12–14; and Chan and Tong 2001, 5–7+
11+ See Clifford 1994; Cheah and Robbins 1998; Lavie and Swedenburg 1996; Liu 1998, 607; Bao
1998; and Chan and Tong 2001, 6+
12+ Wang 2000+
13+ See ^www+huaren+org&+
14+ See Wayne Arnold, “Chinese Diaspora Using Internet to Aid Plight of Brethren Abroad,” Wall
Street Journal, 23 July 1998; and Hughes 2000, 205– 6+
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of diasporic Chinese as a postnational cosmopolitan community of “transnational
yuppies” who are constantly in motion+15 Instead of searching for the true Sino-
Thai “third culture” in relation to some stable notion of ‘Thai-ness’ and ‘Chinese-
ness’, this article shows how diaspora both constructs and deconstructs the
seemingly opposing forces of nationalism and cosmopolitanism+ Diasporas are a
key element in the construction of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, not through
an appeal to shared norms, but in the tension between norms and difference, self
and Other+ To understand how this tension produces communities, it is helpful to
turn to anthropology and ethnographic methods to show how borders of territory
and identity are negotiated in the social relations of identity and difference+16
Before exploring anthropological constructivism, it is helpful to recall the emer-
gence of sociological constructivism in IR theory+ Rationalist theories are gener-
ally suspicious of cultural arguments; they claim that “identities and norms are
either derivative of material capabilities or are deployed by autonomous actors for
instrumental reasons+” 17 Hence, culture and norms enter the fray of international
politics as variables in the rational calculation of strategic culture+18 This severely
limits the impact of culture on our understanding of IR+ As Weber argues for
“gender,” treating culture as a variable contains it within hegemonic discourse as
an add-on that does not disturb our structures of rationality+ By seeing gender “not
as something that can be placed, but instead as something that helps us place things,”
Weber encourages one likewise to use culture as a way of reconceptualizing pol-
itics+19 Rather than looking at culture and identity as stable “things,” sociological
constructivism urges one to see identity as the product of negotiated relations+ As
Barnett argues for diplomacy in the Middle East, “identity, as a relational con-
struct emerges out of the international and domestic discourse and interactions,
imprints security politics and helps us to understand the dynamics of alliance
formation+” 20
As part of a dialogue with rationalist IR theory, the first generation of sociolog-
ical constructivist texts largely focused their analysis on national security to see
how norms guide state policy+21 More recently, sociological constructivists have
broadened the agenda from national security and national interest to nonstate ac-
tors and nonmilitary issues+ The chapters in Restructuring World Politics, for ex-
ample, expand the arena of international norms beyond the “society of states” to
analyze how norms work in “nonstate actors of various kinds+” 22 In particular,
15+ Ong 1999, 19, 24, 110–36, 175+
16+ Like the “sociological” in sociological constructivism, the “anthropological” in anthropological
constructivism does not aim to account for that entire disciplinary field+ Following Clifford Geertz, I
am using the term to highlight the practices of ethnography and thick description+ See Geertz 1993, 5+
17+ Katzenstein 1996, 5+
18+ See Johnston 1996, 221; and Weldes et al+ 1999, 3+
19+ Weber 2001, 89+
20+ Barnett 1996, 447+
21+ Katzenstein 1996; also see Finnemore 1996+
22+ Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002, 14+
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they chart how transnational networks, coalitions, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and social movements are “makers and managers of meaning” in guiding
the norms of world politics+23
This extension of sociological constructivism to address transnational social
movements is very helpful for the analysis of the politics of cosmopolitanism and
diaspora+ But the focus on the construction of identity through norms, I argue,
only covers half of the relations that produce identity+ Sikkink points out that if
one accepts that norms are not merely epiphenomena produced by hegemonic states,
one needs “to know how these new international norm structures of social pur-
pose are constructed, maintained, and transformed+” 24 To answer this question, I
argue that one needs to understand how the self-identity of nationalism depends
not just on shared norms, but also on the exclusion of Others such as diasporic
groups+ To analyze this self0Other relation, one needs to move from sociological
constructivism to anthropological constructivism+
Whereas the sociological approach tends to search for “norms” as positive
inclusive values—“the fabric that holds pluralistic societies together”—
anthropological approaches foreground how communities are formed by exclud-
ing difference: security depends on insecurities+25 Instead of discovering a coherent
national culture that could easily be essentialized by rationalists as a discrete
“substance,”—a variable that affects state policy—the anthropological approach
highlights how identity and difference mutually constitute each other+26 Rather than
looking to culture as a substance that has content, one can see how culture takes
shape in context-sensitive relations between identity and difference+
Many sociological constructivists are leaning in this direction+ Sikkink acknowl-
edges the mutual construction of self and Other when she notes how “Many norms
have both empowering and exclusionary effects+” 27 Barnett more directly looks at
how “identity emerges as a consequence of taking into consideration a relevant
‘other+’ ” 28 In a similar way, Weldes et al+ foreground how culture is multiple and
“composed of potentially contested codes and representations, as designating a
field on which are fought battles over meaning+” 29 These battles between identity
and difference thus are not simply clashes between the specific norms of national
identities or competing concepts of human rights+ Insecurities also come from con-
ceptual differences such as nation0diaspora and nationalism0cosmopolitanism+
Rather than just looking to international society or global civil society for trans-
23+ Ibid+, 11; see also Sikkink 2002, 302+
24+ Sikkink 2002, 302+
25+ See Kowert and Legro 1996, 454; and Weldes et al+ 1999; see also Lapid and Kratochwil 1996;
and Krause and Williams 1997+
26+ See Weldes et al+ 1999, 19; and Appadurai 1996, 12+
27+ Sikkink 2002, 310+
28+ Barnett 1996, 408+
29+ See Weldes et al+ 1999, 2; Shapiro 1997, 36; Dirlik 1998; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002,
14; and Barnett 1996, 408–11+ On the other hand, Campbell argues that there are important differences
between what I am calling the sociological and the anthropological approaches+ Campbell 1998, 212–25+
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national politics, one needs to analyze how borders are produced through differ-
ence and exclusion in many different local, national, and global contexts+ Indeed,
the detailed and decentered analysis afforded by an anthropological ethnography
enables one to examine how the identity of diasporic Chinese is meaningful not
just as an “ethnic problem” in the post–Cold War world+ The Chinese diaspora
has been crucial for global capitalism, national identity, and provincial politics for
more than a century+ Diasporas are useful, in other words, just because they are
strange+ In the context of IR theory, they provide a “crack” that shows the rela-
tions of power that constitute both national identity and alternatives to it+30
This ethnographic approach to the transnational politics of diaspora allows one
to look in different places for evidence+ For example, the reigning paradigms for
the political economy of East Asia typically do not emphasize cultural elements—
developmental state theory and neoclassical economics typically are transfixed by
struggles between the state and the market+31 This article builds on recent studies
that highlight the interplay of political economy and culture in regional and trans-
national politics to examine diasporic economic culture+32 It is popular to argue
that overseas Chinese capitalism, also known as Confucian capitalism, relies on
the economic culture of “a positive attitude toward the affairs of the world, a sus-
tained lifestyle of discipline and self-cultivation, respect for authority, frugality,
and an overriding concern for stable family life+” 33 The small and medium-sized
family firms of Chinese capitalism are noted for their flexibility and quick deci-
sion making+ Together, these values describe a network capitalism that works ac-
cording to guanxi-relationships between diasporic Chinese entrepreneurs and
officials in the PRC+ The comparative advantage of the diaspora’s Confucian cap-
italism is that cultural ties lower the transaction costs of doing business in China
where the legal system is underdeveloped+ Rather than just looking to formal
institutional regimes that are state-based, economic culture also allows one to
examine how the informal practices of everyday life produce nationalism and
cosmopolitanism+
Yet economic culture as a set of “core values” is conceptually problematic: it
has been used as shorthand to explain both the unique transnational characteristics
that produced the Asia economic miracle and the unique Thai values that resist
globalization+34 But when one uses an anthropological approach that examines pol-
itics in terms of the tension between identity and difference, rather than identity
and norms, one can see that the guanxi network of relationships is not simply
between ethnic Chinese, and for economic gain+ An examination of the relations
between identity and difference shows how diasporic insecurities produce identity
30+ See Weldes et al+ 1999, 17, 20; Marcus 1999, xi; and Shapiro 1997+
31+ See Robison et al+, 2000; Woo-Cumings 1999; and World Bank 1993+
32+ See Cumings 1999; Dirlik 1998; Katzenstein 1997; Ong 1999; Shapiro and Alker 1996; Appa-
durai 1996; and Nonini and Ong 1997+
33+ See Berger 1988, 7–8; and Bolt 2000+
34+ See Tu 1996; Berger 1988; and Pasuk and Baker 2000, 210+
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in both its nationalist and cosmopolitan forms+ As I show, these boundaries are
not territorial, but cultural and economic; power is not measured just according to
military force and economic growth, but according to the diasporic public sphere’s
“cultural arsenals” of temples, fraternal organizations, newspapers, and schools+35
Economic culture, therefore, is a useful way of describing culture as a set of prac-
tices rather than a set of ideas+
To understand how diaspora both constructs and deconstructs nationalism and
cosmopolitanism, one needs to employ a critical use of the anthropological ap-
proach+ The weakness of an anthropological approach is the opposite of state-
centric IR theory: it tends to bypass the state by jumping directly from the tribal
to the postnational, the local to the global+ Hence, the next two sections examine
the role of diaspora in the production of the borders of nation-states+
Chinese Identity: Neo-Nationalism and Diaspora
The Chinese diaspora has always been a problematic concept+ As either national-
ists or cosmopolitans, overseas Chinese have been measured against the norm of a
single and coherent culture+ The policy choices of assimilation and multicultural-
ism both look to a core of Chinese culture that is either modified or preserved+
Wang Gungwu’s problems in even naming this population are indicative: the first
substantive footnotes in many of his essays lament the difficulty of defining ‘Chi-
neseness’ or naming the overseas Chinese+36 But rather than trying to define over-
seas Chinese as a coherent “thing,” one needs to understand their identity as a
relation+ This section argues that the nation and the diaspora are not separate au-
tonomous “substances” with core identities; rather, Chinese nationalism and dias-
pora take on meaning in relation to each other+ Indeed, the concepts of “nationalism”
and “overseas Chinese” both appeared at the end of the nineteenth century, and I
argue that this was not a coincidence: nationalism and cosmopolitanism produced
each other in tension+ In this section then, I first examine how Chinese national-
ism is not regulated by a collection of core values as many texts explain; identity
has been produced against the difference of Western empire, Chinese empire, and
diasporic Chinese+ This is not simply a history lesson, for the dynamic of nation-
alism and cosmopolitanism is again producing Chinese identity in familiar ways+
For the past fifteen years, PRC policy has been not simply to recruit overseas
Chinese as patriotic investors, but to reeducate the diaspora in their national history+
Since the 1990s, nationalism has once again become a major topic in Chinese
politics, with many security studies analysts searching for the guiding norms of
Chinese civilization+ One needs to understand the hyper-realism of Chinese for-
eign policy, for example, not just according to the economic analysis of the Chi-
35+ Duara 1997, 50; also see Appadurai 1996, 4+
36+ Wang 1991, 216, 236, 253+
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nese state as a rational actor, but according to exotic culture and history+37 In both
academic and popular culture within China itself, the rise of nationalism has like-
wise been accompanied by a rediscovery of China’s glorious 5,000-year civiliza-
tion+ National Studies Fever—Guoxue re—in the 1990s stressed the achievements
of the Chinese nation in a very positive way+ But this new nationalism also cre-
ated new enemies: Guoxue’s nativist search for “authentic” ways of being Chi-
nese can be both anti-modern and anti-Western+38
The timing of this rediscovery of Chinese nationalism is important+ In the early
1990s, the PRC faced political and economic crises both domestically with the
Tiananmen massacre, and globally with the fall of the Soviet Union+ Though the
economic reform policy was reasserted in 1992, the political struggle was re-
solved in favor of a neoconservative nationalism+ The PRC has particular ways of
promoting this new form of nationalism+ While positive notions of identity prolif-
erated via Guoxue, a more negative production of identity has also been promi-
nent+ The 1990s also saw the reappearance of the discourse of National Humiliation+
Like Guoxue, it first became prominent in the 1910s and 1920s as China faced the
twin challenges of imperialism and modernity+ While Guoxue addressed the prob-
lems of modernity, National Humiliation—Guochi— addressed the problem of im-
perialism+39 To understand neo-nationalism and national security, it is necessary
to understand national insecurities+ In other words, one needs to reverse Paul
Kennedy’s famous thesis about “the rise and fall of the great powers” to examine
the “fall and rise” of China+
Chinese textbooks characteristically talk of the “Century of National Humilia-
tion” to define modern Chinese history and to celebrate the foundation of the PRC
in 1949+ National Salvation thus does not make sense separate from National Hu-
miliation+ The discourse of National Humiliation recounts how, at the hands of
foreign invaders and corrupt Chinese regimes, sovereignty was lost, territory dis-
membered, and the Chinese people thus humiliated+ The Opium War—whereby
the British navy pried open the Chinese empire to Western capitalism—is usually
seen as the beginning of the Century of National Humiliation, and the communist
revolution in 1949 as the end+As a key patriotic education textbook puts it: “Never
forget National Humiliation+ + + + The invasion of the imperialist powers and the
domestic reactionary ruling class’s corrupt stupidity together created the roots of
this catastrophe+” 40
Thus the foreign Other is not the only focus of National Humiliation+ The Chi-
nese nation has its problems too+ The primary contradiction of foreign imperial-
ism was exacerbated by the ineptitude of the various regimes that preceded the
PRC: the misdeeds of the Qing dynasty and the republican regime are summa-
37+ See Swaine and Tellis 2000; Zheng 1999; Johnston 1996; and Dittmer and Kim 1993+
38+ See Zheng 1999, 157+
39+ For an early discussion of the dynamic between Guoxue and National Humiliation, see Hou
1915+
40+ Guo 1996, 126+
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rized as “domestic corrupt stupidity+” This is not simply a battle against a differ-
ent race ~the Qing were Manchu! or different ideology ~the republican leaders were
from the rival political party!, because both of these groups are condemned as
Chinese traitors who “sold out the nation+” The conclusion that the discourse of
National Humiliation draws is that the Chinese people need a strong state to save
the nation from evil imperialists: past, present, and future+ This discourse is very
popular in both official and popular culture in China+ Long after the century ended
in 1949, National Humiliation springs up in conversation and public opinion to
explain diplomatic crises such as the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Bel-
grade ~1999!, campaigns to host the Olympics ~1993 and 2001!, and the crash of
the EP-3 surveillance plane ~2001!+ Thus National Humiliation discourse uses mod-
ern Chinese history to secure the Chinese people to a particular territory+ This
essentialist construction of identity takes both Chinese people and Chinese terri-
tory as self-evident categories+ National Humiliation forcefully reasserts the hy-
phen between nation and state+41
Diasporic Identity
There was also a rebirth of overseas Chinese identity in the late 1980s because of
two factors that accompanied Deng’s economic reforms+ The open-door policy al-
lowed a host of “new immigrants” to leave China+ It also invited the older gener-
ation of wealthy overseas Chinese to return and invest in their homeland as part
of the economic network of “Greater China+” 42 Overseas Chinese identity has been
involved in a cosmopolitan dynamic that largely bypasses not just Southeast Asian
nation-states, but the PRC as well+ Popular business authors such as John Naisbitt,
and noted academics such as Tu Weiming, have stressed that Greater China and
overseas Chinese economic success need to be understood separately from Beijing’s
centralized political control+ Naisbitt writes, “It is not China+ It is the Chinese
network” to explain the grand shift in economic activity from nation-states to net-
works+ In the early 1990s, Tu likewise noted the “glaring absence of the PRC” in
East Asian success stories, and argued that now the “periphery @that is, the Chi-
nese diaspora# sets the agenda for the center+” 43
In this section I argue that one also needs to consider how diasporic identity is
produced in relation to the nation-state+ The PRC has labored to see ‘Chineseness’
as an essential identity tied to its state+ The relation of overseas identity and do-
41+ For a more detailed discussion of National Humiliation and international politics, see Callahan
forthcoming ~b!+
42+ It is common to assume that Western multinational corporations ~MNCs! are the main investors
in China+ But diasporic Chinese ~including Taiwan and Hong Kong! account for around 80 percent of
foreign direct investment in the PRC+ This is significant to the global political economy because the
PRC is the second-ranking host country for foreign investment after the United States+ See Bolt 2000,
3, 9, 1; Callahan forthcoming ~a!; and Shambaugh 1995+
43+ See Naisbitt 1996, 7; and Tu 1994, 12+
Chinese Diaspora in China and Thailand 491
mestic nationalism is shown in the creation of the term for overseas Chinese, hua-
qiao+ Though Chinese have been traveling abroad for millennia, the creation of a
single term to name this group is quite recent, taking form at the same time that
nationalism gained currency in China+ Before 1893, there was a legal ban on over-
seas travel+ The government saw unofficial travelers as “vagabonds, fugitives, or
outlaws” who risked punishment as criminals on returning to China+44 The consti-
tution of huaqiao identity is not just part of the production of Chinese national-
ism, but is related to National Humiliation+ Historically, Chinese only migrated in
large numbers as a result of the economic and political dislocation that started
with the “invasion of foreign countries’ capitalism” after the Opium War+45 As
Wang argues, the term huaqiao was crafted by the Qing regime “to encourage
sojourners to identify with China and Chinese civilization+” 46 Though huaqiao
was a new word, it had an ancient pedigree that framed the overseas Chinese as
an “elegant and respectable” group+47 Thus in the late nineteenth century, overseas
Chinese were transformed from outlaws into honored mandarins as part of an im-
perial nationalism+
In the late twentieth century, overseas Chinese are again being recruited into
the narrative of National Humiliation as patriotic “sons of the Yellow Emperor”
who thus form “a part of China’s history which is splattered with blood and tears+” 48
Thus the Chinese state is trying to not only lure overseas Chinese investment into
the PRC, but also to reeducate the diaspora in National Humiliation history+ Offi-
cial National Humiliation texts are increasingly co-published in Hong Kong in
traditional Chinese characters for overseas distribution+ Specialized texts have been
directed squarely at Hong Kong and diasporic audiences to knit them into official
nationalism+ For example, in the preface to a slick National Humiliation text, the
director of the Chinese Revolutionary History Museum in Beijing explains that
the book “will help overseas Chinese, especially our young friends overseas, to
understand this period of the motherland’s history+” 49
Mainland descriptions of the overseas Chinese experience neatly mirror the logic
of National Humiliation discourse+ Similar to Guo’s patriotic education textbook
cited above, Ren and Zhao list the reasons for the diaspora as stemming from both
foreign invasion and domestic corruption: “among the foreign reasons we must
stress the frenzied plunder of China’s cheap labor by the foreign invaders, among
the domestic reasons we must stress the basic corruption and ineptitude of the
Qing government, which was powerless to protect our people from the foreign
44+ See Wang 2000, 43; and McKeown 1999, 323+
45+ See Ren and Zhao 1999, 2; and Wang 1992+
46+ Wang 2000, 47+
47+ See Wang 46; and Duara 1997, 42– 43+
48+ Ren and Zhao 1999, 380–81, 1+
49+ Shen 1997, 7+ This museum is one of the important institutions of the discourse of National
Humiliation+ To see how it framed the mainland Chinese understanding of the return of Hong Kong,
see Callahan forthcoming ~a!, chap+ 6+
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invaders’ human trafficking+” 50 Chinese identity thus expands, via National Hu-
miliation, from being defined according to citizenship and territoriality to a wider
transnational view of the Chinese race: “China is not just the most populous coun-
try in the world; it also has the most populous diaspora+” 51 According to these
sources, the 25 million diasporic Chinese constitute the third largest economy in
the world+ Overseas Chinese are therefore characteristically figured as a financial
resource for the Chinese nationalist project+ This financial aid has also lent the
various revolutions and regimes added symbolic legitimacy: the PRC and Taiwan
still struggle for the loyalty of overseas Chinese as part of their transnational, na-
tional reunification strategies+52
The national shame, therefore, is not just about the loss of the Chinese body
politic where imperialist powers divided up the “sacred territory,” but of the loss
of many Chinese bodies+ The purpose of founding a strong nation was not just to
reunify China, but to protect diasporic Chinese who otherwise “deeply know the
shame and pain of a weak country+” Hence, according to mainland sources, over-
seas Chinese understand that “their own destiny is wrapped up in the destiny of
the motherland+” 53 Indeed, the language of National Humiliation is key in main-
land understandings of diaspora+ Persecution of Chinese overseas during the Cen-
tury of National Humiliation was not just physical or financial, but a question of
“respect”—or the lack of it: “If Chinese people were bullied locally, that was be-
cause China received no respect internationally+” 54 The rape of ethnic Chinese in
Indonesia was therefore seen as a measure of the diplomatic weakness of the PRC+
Overseas Chinese experience thus not only becomes a chapter in the history of
National Humiliation textbooks as a problem to be solved, but as a “reflection of
the development of modern Chinese history” itself+55
Diasporic Chinese are therefore not simply a financial resource for China+ The
dynamic of diasporic persecution and National Humiliation is used as a symbolic
resource for producing Chinese national identity+ Curiously, these financial and
symbolic resources, which are transnational and deterritorialized in diaspora, are
used to consolidate the identity of the Chinese nation+ The more obvious the na-
tional difference abroad, the greater the need for a strong Chinese state to protect
the diaspora both diplomatically and militarily+ It is common to conclude that di-
asporic Chinese nationalism ended in the 1950s, with the end of immigration from
the PRC and the rise of postcolonial nationalism in Southeast Asia+56 But nation-
alism continues to grow both at home and abroad+ Over the past century, a series
50+ See Ren and Zhao 1999, 5; and Yang 1991, 47+
51+ Ren and Zhao 1999, 380+
52+ Wang 2000, 67+ This is the main topic of Ren and Zhao 1999+
53+ Ren and Zhao 1999, 9+
54+ See McKeown 1999, 326; and Yang 1991, 45+
55+ See Liang 1999, 25–31; Li and Peng 1995, 61–82; Jiang 1927, 281–93; Yang 1991, 43; and
Ding 1999+
56+ Wang 1991+
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of atrocities provoked national outrage among new and old immigrants: at the turn
of the twentieth century by anti-Chinese immigration policies in North America
and Australasia, in the mid-twentieth century by the Anti-Japanese War and the
Rape of Nanjing, and at the turn of the twenty-first century by the rape and mur-
der of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia+ In each of these cases, the national and the
cosmopolitan produce each other, regardless of whether it is the diaspora protest-
ing national problems or the nation protesting diasporic problems+ In other words,
though one often assumes that nationalism is defined by positive norms, there is
nothing like a humiliating atrocity to unite a diverse and dispersed population into
a community+57 In addition to gathering around glorious Chinese civilization, di-
asporic Chinese communities increasingly identify with the National Humiliation
of such atrocities+As Buruma sarcastically concludes, “It is, it appears, not enough
for Chinese-Americans to be seen as the heirs of a great civilization; they want to
be recognized as heirs of their very own Holocaust+” 58 Hence, overseas Chinese
not only network for economic gain in a mobile “third culture,” but for social and
political projects as well, to produce a transnational form of nationalism+
The next section turns these questions around—first to see how diasporic Chi-
nese have been used in a negative way to produce Thai nationalism+ It then exam-
ines how Sino-Thai have been among the most vociferous supporters of an inclusive
neo-nationalism since 1997+ This argument reconfirms how nationalism depends
on cosmopolitan Chinese, and how diaspora is more than a financial resource+ It
has had considerable symbolic power in constructing and deconstructing the Thai
nation+
Diaspora and Neo-Nationalism in Thailand
Nationalism in Thailand has a time-honored tradition of using diasporic Chinese
as the Other against which the ‘Thai-ness’ is defined+ Overseas Chinese were not
just the fifth column of republican and then communist revolution in China+ They
also have been a key element in the formation of Thai nationalism+ While Chinese
nationals banded together with the diaspora to fight against Western imperialism
in the Century of National Humiliation, in Thailand, the Chinese have been used
as a symbolic resource in national identity construction in a negative way: the
“essential outsider” against whom a national self is constructed+59 Especially after
the Chinese republican revolution of 1911 and communist revolution in 1949, the
Thai elite questioned the loyalty and utility of their large urban Chinese popula-
tion+ To stem the spread of republican revolutionary ideas in the 1910s and com-
munist ideology in the 1950s, the Thai state strengthened its policy of regulating
57+ See Clifford 1994; and Chaliand and Rageau 1997+
58+ Ian Buruma, “The Joys and Perils of Victimhood,” New York Review of Books, 8 April 1999, 4+
59+ Chirot and Reid 1997+
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the Chinese population, especially Chinese education+60 Most famously, King Rama
VI wrote “Jews of the Orient” ~1914! as part of Thailand’s transition from a multi-
ethnic empire into an exclusive nation-state+61 According to the Thai officials, “Sino-
Thai” was a contradiction in terms: you had to be one or the other+ Diasporic
Chinese nationalism thus both preceded and provoked nationalism in Thailand,
Malaysia, and the Philippines+62
Most studies of overseas Chinese identity overlook this negative use of the di-
aspora by highlighting how Thailand has been accommodating to diasporic Chi-
nese as fellow Buddhists—at least when compared with harsher regimes in the
neighboring Islamic societies of Malaysia and Indonesia+63 For example, Prime
Minister Gen+ Chaovalit Yongchaiyut tried to blame Sino-Thai capitalists for the
1997 economic meltdown, calling them “the nation’s problem+” Though this was a
very successful diversionary measure in other countries—the state encouraged anti-
Chinese riots in Indonesia to save Suharto—it did not work in Thailand+ After a
public outcry, Chaovalit apologized and complained that he had been misunder-
stood+64 This rapid about-face showed the power of the Sino-Thai, who are now
not only businesspeople, but also journalists, academics, and civil servants+ Actu-
ally, it is easier to study diasporic Chinese in Malaysia, where difference has been
institutionalized into the official ethnic categories of Malay, Chinese, and Indian+
But as this section shows, Thailand is a useful site to examine diasporic Chinese
identity production just because of the ambiguous nature of the distinction be-
tween Chinese and Thai+ As Chaovalit’s awkward experience shows, people have
to work hard to make distinctions between the Chinese, Thai, and Sino-Thai
populations+
While neo-nationalism arose in China to address a political crisis—the end of
the Cold War and the Tiananmen massacre—in Thailand, neo-nationalism became
an issue because of an economic crisis+ Because of a range of factors that have
been well-analyzed elsewhere, the Thai economy abruptly slipped from four de-
cades of uninterrupted growth into a world-class depression in July 1997+65 Once
the Thai baht was floated on international currency markets, it lost half its value,
spurring the Thai government to secure a $17 billion rescue package from the
International Monetary Fund ~IMF!+ These funds came with the conditionality of
a structural adjustment of the Thai political economy that stressed policy and in-
stitutional reforms that would promote open markets and good governance+ The
Thai government passed a raft of bills to reform bankruptcy and foreclosure laws,
and to loosen up restrictions on foreign ownership+ The result was the closure of
60+ See Thirakruek phiti 1999, 92–93; Wang 1992; and Chan and Tong 2001+
61+ Asavabahu 1941+
62+ Reid 1997, 51+
63+ See Skinner 1957; and Chan and Tong 2001+
64+ Chang Noi, “Revisiting Dark Corners of Our Political Past,” The Nation ~Bangkok!, 24 Septem-
ber 1997; see also Kasian 1999, 33–37+
65+ See Robison et al+ 2000+
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three-quarters of the finance companies and the nationalization of four of Thai-
land’s major banks, which altogether wiped out one-third of Thailand’s financial
system+ Additionally, 69,000 other companies needed debt restructuring+ Multi-
national corporations ~MNCs! from Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Europe, and the
United States bought Thai assets at “fire sale” prices+ At the nadir of the crisis in
1998, the economy contracted by 9 percent, poverty rose by 20 percent, and un-
employment to more than 2 million+66
Economics and Neo-Nationalism
The first political reaction to the 1997 economic crisis in Thailand was not the
expected nationalism that would target the usual suspects, the overseas Chinese+
Instead, Thai public intellectuals created a new set of Others: liberals and the West+
According to the neo-nationalists, the solution to the 1997 economic crisis was
not a financial restructuring, but a reassertion of Thai national identity and econ-
omy+ Thai neo-nationalism trumpeted the notion of economic and cultural self-
sufficiency that often romanticized the Buddhist village community as part of its
rejection of urbanism, consumerism and industrialism+
Neo-nationalism in Thailand thus uses a similar set of images to Chinese neo-
nationalism: Thai as slaves to foreigners, the semi-colonialism of economic impe-
rialism, and immoral foreign robber-barons+ While treaties signed between 1842
and 1949 were seen as unequal and thus illegitimate in China’s Century of Na-
tional Humiliation, Thai foreign debt in 1997 was framed as illegitimate+ Once
again, foreign invasion and domestic corruption—the debts that the Thai public
had to pay—were created by the exploitative policies of the West in collaboration
with the corrupt elite in Bangkok+67 The purpose of Thai neo-nationalism is to
“save the nation” from such corrupt traitors who risked “selling out the nation+”
Indeed, the United Thai for National Salvation Club was formed in 2000 to argue
this case+ This club sponsored a special issue of Political Economy, “The Decla-
ration of Neo-Nationalism,” which was published to influence the political cam-
paign for the January 2001 general election—which was won by a “nationalist”
party+68
Though it is easy to write off Thai neo-nationalism as a knee-jerk populist re-
action to a painful crisis that was used instrumentally by some political parties, it
is important to understand it in its full complexity+ This neo-nationalism gathered
together an often contradictory group of promoters from political, economic and
66+ See Hewison 2000b; and Pasuk and Baker 2000+
67+ See Khamprakat haeng yuksamai 2000, 13ff; Pasuk and Baker 2000; and Prapat et al+ 2000,
225–28+
68+ Numerous articles in newspapers and magazines were published on the topic, as well as a spe-
cial issue of another Thai journal, New Politics, which is much more critical of neo-nationalism+ Chat-
niyom 2001+ It is noteworthy that the neo-nationalist articles appeared in Political Economy, a journal
otherwise known for its critical left-wing perspective+
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civil society: the monarchist0bureaucratic elite, national business leaders, and pro-
gressive grassroots activists all called for a return to a national0local economy+
Some criticized economic liberalization to promote social justice for the poor and
oppressed, others—including businesspeople—expanded the criticism of global-
ization to target the immorality of capitalism and consumerism more generally+69
Utopian views of the Thai Buddhist village community culture can serve two pur-
poses+ On the one hand, they have been part of this localist notion of economic
culture, but on the other, they have been used by conservative institutions to pro-
mote the authoritarian linkage of “Nation, Religion, and Monarchy” first proposed
by King Rama VI+ For example, in 1998 the Ministry of the Interior tried to turn
the grassroots social democracy of neo-nationalism into yet another top-down de-
velopment strategy+70
Actually, the neo-nationalists did not engage in a debate about the merits of
alternative development strategies—they did not present an economic plan+71 Even
the “nationalist” prime minister who was elected in January 2001 did not have a
coherent nationalist economic policy: sometimes he praised self-sufficiency, other
times he promoted foreign investment and an export-oriented economy+ But rather
than looking at what divides these various strands of neo-nationalism, it is impor-
tant to see how neo-nationalism only makes sense in terms of its relation to the
Other+ The progressive, bourgeois, and reactionary nationalists—who fundamen-
tally disagree about most issues in Thai politics—are unified here by a common
target: foreign capitalism, specifically the IMF+ As one newspaper columnist put
it, “This new nationalism is the child of the IMF’s @Managing Director# Michel
Camdessus+ + + +” 72 According to this argument, the issues are not about the political
economy of class and capitalism, but the economic culture of territory and citizen-
ship+ The president of the Thai Senate proclaimed, “the poor, struggling, indebted
Thai are threatened by rich, foreign creditors+” 73 Thus Thai business, even if it is
a “monopoly or oligopoly,” is seen by neo-nationalists as virtuous because the
wealth still stays in the country+74 Likewise, all the neo-nationalist groups looked
to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s strong mercantilist response to the crisis+
Malaysia’s capital controls were praised more for their ideological meaning than
their economic efficacy: Mahathir was hailed because he did not bow to the IMF+
This support was a major shift for many of the progressive neo-nationalists who
previously had been critical of Mahathir’s authoritarian politics+75
69+ See McCargo 2001; Hewison 2000a; Pasuk and Baker 2000; Wittayakorn 2000; Narong Chok-
wattana 2000; Chatthip and Siriphorn 2000; and Kasian 1999, 41+
70+ See Ministry of the Interior 1998; and Hewison 2000a, 290+
71+ See Hewison 2000a, 291; and Chang Noi, “Nationalism and White Peril,” The Nation ~Bang-
kok!, 13 November 2000+
72+ Chang Noi, “Nationalism and White Peril,” The Nation ~Bangkok!, 13 November 2000+
73+ The Nation ~Bangkok!, 12 February 1998+
74+ Narong Phechprasert in Nantiya Tangwisutijit “Rethinking Nationalism: Is It Always Evil?”
The Nation ~Bangkok!, 5 November 2000+
75+ See Amarin 2000; Pasuk and Baker 2000, 176; and Hewison 2001b, 220+
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Those in Thailand who questioned the efficacy or ethics of neo-nationalism were
summarily dismissed as “naïve,” “weak, stupid, and morally cowardly,” “crazily
following Western slogans of liberalization, globalization, and accountability,” “stu-
pidly following foreigners,” “being brainwashed by foreigners,” “childishly liber-
al,” “alarmist and frankly intolerant,” and “blindly following the global system+” 76
In its more extreme form, neo-nationalism dismisses those who supported a liberal
political economy not only as stupid, but as un-Thai traitors who wished to “sell
the country+” 77 One commentator approvingly notes how traitors who sold out the
country to Burma in the late eighteenth century were beheaded under King Taksin+78
Democracy and Neo-Nationalism
The Thai do not have to go back 200 years for examples of a violent enforcement
of nationalism+ Many of these same activists and opinion-makers were victims of
the Thai state’s criminalization of difference in the recent past+ Up until 1973,
nationalism in Thailand was largely used as a tool by a series of military dictator-
ships to repress left-wing movements+ Even after the popular democracy interreg-
num of 1973–76, progressive politics has largely been understood as anti-military
or pro-democracy rather than as pro-nationalist+
Memories of a repressive anti-Chinese nationalism were still fresh just before
the economic crisis in 1997+ Reacting to renewed calls for a right-wing national-
ism that excluded Sino-Thai as communists, Kasian Tejapira wrote:
Thai has many forms+ There are communist Thai, fascist Thai, democratic
Thai, dictator Thai, Free Thai, and tyrant Thai+ Now I am no longer a com-
munist, but I want to insist that communists are also Thai in the same way as
fascists are Thai+ Therefore Thai who have different ideas should try to ex-
press their ideas peacefully instead of shooting M16s from helicopters or fir-
ing rounds from tanks+79
Here Kasian is part of the general movement among a new generation of Thai
neo-nationalists to be more inclusive and democratic+ It is noteworthy that many
of the essays go out of their way to cite as authorities progressive nationalist he-
roes such as Pridi Phanomyong, rather than militant nationalists such as Field Mar-
shalls P+ Phibulsongkram ~Phibul! and Sarit Thanarat+ Indeed, many of the same
people who were pushing for liberal or grassroots democracy in the early 1990s
~against military dictatorship! now argued for a democratic nationalism ~against
76+ Author’s interview with Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Bangkok, 14 December 2000; Prapat et al+ 2000,
225–28; Dej 2000; Somchai 2000; Pasuk and Baker 2000, 215; and Chang Noi, “Nationalism and
White Peril,” The Nation ~Bangkok!, 13 November 2000+
77+ See Khamprakat haeng yuksamai 2000, 18–22; Narong Chokwattana 2000, 94–95; Kasian 1999,
41; and Pasuk and Baker 2000, 161ff+
78+ Likhit 2000; also see Amarin Khoman, “Unctad Go Home!” Bangkok Post, 13 February 2000+
79+ Kasian 1999, 197; also see Chang Noi, “Revisiting Dark Corners of Our Political Past,” The
Nation ~Bangkok!, 24 September 1997; Chatniyom 2001+
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economic imperialism!+ In this way, the criticisms of corruption are not simply
defining domestic enemies but entail a critical engagement with reform politics
and extra-parliamentary popular politics+ Many of the more thoughtful writers are
trying to pry nationalism away from the military and bureaucratic elite to guide
popular democracy+ The Nation is defined by the elements of the people, liberty,
and justice+80
Race and Neo-Nationalism
Certainly, Thai nationalism has been involved in racial politics+ This can be graph-
ically seen in the change of names by the militarist regime in 1939: “Siam” named
a multiethnic country, while “Thai-land” is racially exclusive+ Neo-nationalists are
quite aware of the anti-Chinese history of their ideology+ But their reaction since
1997 has not been to reject nationalism, as many progressives had in the past, but
to embrace an explicitly inclusive form of Thai nationalism+ Unlike in China, where
neo-nationalism is closely related to ethnicity, the key here to being Thai is not
pure Thai blood, but citizenship and participation in Thai life+ Thus “genuine na-
tionalism” is differentiated from racism+81
Part of this shift toward toleration is practical+ Even if the Thai elite desired
to once again discriminate against diasporic Chinese, logistically it would be
very difficult—as Chaovalit saw in 1997+ In the past, “Chinese” lived in certain
communities—Chinatowns—and engaged in certain businesses+ But now Chinese
and Thai have intermixed to such an extent that they are difficult to differentiate+
Authentic ‘Thai-ness’ is not just an ideological non-issue, but a racial non-issue as
well+ As Kasian Tejapira, a key theorist of both neo-nationalism and Sino-Thai
identity, argues:
The ultranationalist history cannot blame the economic crisis in the 1990s on
the Sino-Thai because Thailand in 1998 is much different from Thailand dur-
ing Phibul era of sixty years ago+ During Phibul’s era, the nationalist move-
ment was anti-Chinese+ The imaginary lines that divided between Thai and
Chinese were possible+ But by now, “Chineseness” has been assimilated into
“Thai-ness” and cannot be easily separated+ Therefore now it is difficult to
draw a line to divide Jek @Chinese# from the Thai and claim that Jek are the
national enemies+ The boundary of the definition of Thai-ness has already
expanded to include Jek to unite with the Thai+ + + +82
80+ See Narong Chokwattana in Chatniyom 2001, 24; Dej 2000; Whittiyakorn 2000; Kasian 1999;
and Nidhi Aoesriwong in Chatniyom 2001, 9+
81+ See Kasian 1997, 88; Likhit 2000; Amarin 2000; Nantiya Tangwisutijit “Rethinking National-
ism: Is It Always Evil?” The Nation ~Bangkok!, 5 November 2000; and Kasian 1999+
82+ Kasian 1999, 40– 41; also see author’s interview with Suwanna Satha-Anand, Bangkok, 27 Au-
gust 1999; author’s interviews in Phuket, December 2000+ Kasian here is reworking the derogatory
Jek—better translated as “Chink”—into a positive part of Thai society+
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But this seemingly cosmopolitan nationalism is not completely differentiated from
racism+ While Sino-Thai commentators extended the shared norms of Thai na-
tional identity to include Chinese and other non-Thai ethnic groups, this expan-
sion of the self has necessitated the creation of a new Other+ The new racism targets
the West, and is often anti-American+
This new Occidentalism arose in a specific context: in 1998, parliament de-
bated the new bankruptcy and foreclosure laws at the same time that it modified
the Alien Business Law+ Hence many Thai felt that the government was simply
selling Thailand to Western MNCs—and cheaply+ Actually, many of the buyers
were from fellow Asian countries: Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan+83 Furthermore,
it is not just foreign firms that are preying on a prostrate Thailand+ Thai firms have
also gone transnational: Thailand’s CP Group is the largest foreign investor in
China+84 Likewise, a “Manifesto of Neo-nationalism” laments that the Thai have
lost their transnational capitalist opportunities: “I see that Singaporeans, Hong
Kongers and Taiwanese own many businesses in our neighbouring countries such
as Burma, Cambodia and Laos+ What a pity that the Thai have lost these opportu-
nities+” 85 But such political-economic arguments miss the point, because the issue
was the economic culture of Thai identity that was framed in racial terms: neo-
nationalism was not simply anti-American, but anti-White+ Rather than talking about
the Yellow Peril of a Chinese threat to Thailand, as King Rama VI did in 1914,
now there are warnings of the “White Peril+” 86 Similar to National Humiliation in
China, the problem is not simply the IMF or liberalism, but the barbaric White
race that is trying ~once again! to subjugate the vulnerable Asian masses+87
Thus a new Thai self is produced by a new Other in much the same way as
National Salvation in China needs National Humiliation+ With the economic crisis
of 1997, neo-nationalism arose not as a positive movement hailing the glories of
the core values of Thai culture—Nation, Religion, and Monarchy—in official dis-
course, but in relation to difference+ Much the same logic and vocabulary was
used as in previous incarnations of Thai hyper-nationalism, but this time with a
twist: Sino-Thai activists were among the most prominent promoters of an inclu-
sive and democratic neo-nationalism+ But this new broader nationalism still de-
pends on difference; the Other is the “White Peril” of the IMF and the West+ Thai
neo-nationalism, therefore, is similar to Chinese neo-nationalism in terms of logic
that produces identity via relations of exclusion, if not in terms of content—this
national unification is of the Thai citizenry rather than the Chinese race+
83+ See Hewison 2000b, 219; Pasuk and Baker 2000, 218+
84+ Ampalavanar-Brown 1998, 611+
85+ Wichit 2000, 224; also Chang Noi, “Nationalism and White Peril,” The Nation ~Bangkok!, 13
November 2000+
86+ See Suthachai 2000, 68; Chang Noi, “Nationalism and White Peril,” The Nation ~Bangkok!, 13
November 2000; and Narong Phechprasert in Nantiya Tangwisutijit “Rethinking Nationalism: Is It
Always Evil?” The Nation ~Bangkok!, 5 November 2000+
87+ See Khamprakat haeng yuksamai 2000, 22–26; Likhit 2000; Surat 2000; Wichit 2000, 221ff;
and Kasian 1999, 41+
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Diasporic Chinese in Thailand
The first two sections have deconstructed essential notions of nation-state and
diaspora to show how diasporic Chinese have been crucial in the production of
Chinese and Thai nationalism+ While cosmopolitan Chinese activities involve trans-
national flows of capital, populations, and information, they are not only postna-
tionalist disjunctures that call boundaries into question+ In the previous sections, I
showed how cosmopolitanism and nationalism produce each other+ This section
highlights how the diaspora forms a set of new communities and thus new bor-
ders+ Though they may seem national, one should be clear that these are not the
territorial borders of the nation-state, so much as economic and cultural borders of
various communities+ Thus the evidence shows how identity is produced through
constructing borders of self and Other, not just for the most obvious case of na-
tional identity, but in relations of exclusion in local and transnational contexts as
well+ The new borders are not simply symbolic constructions; as I illustrate, they
are supported by nonstate actors’ “concrete institutions and networks+” 88
More importantly, these communities show how problematic Thai and Chinese
neo-nationalism are in these contexts+ Even though neo-nationalism was at the
height of its popularity in Bangkok during my fieldwork period in 2000–2001, it
was not an issue that excited interest amongst diasporic Chinese educators, busi-
nesspeople, politicians, and clan organizers+ The neo-nationalist debate is largely
restricted to elite groups in Bangkok who are looked upon with suspicion by pro-
vincial businesspeople and grassroots organizers alike+ They fear that anti-urbanism
and anti-capitalism could easily again target ethnic Chinese merchants+89 This last
section uses fieldwork in Thailand to demonstrate how economic culture is con-
structed in three very different contexts: the national center in Bangkok, a trans-
national node in Phuket, and the rural province of Mahasarakham+ I chose these
three sites because they should best exemplify nationalist, cosmopolitan and local
economic cultures in Thailand+ But the complex ethnographies of these three sites
show how the diaspora calls into question neo-nationalism, globalism, and local-
ism+ Thus the identity politics are not simply between nationalism and cosmopol-
itanism, as most research on diaspora states, but between diaspora and context in
national, transnational and local spaces+
Diasporic Chinese in Bangkok
Comparing two global conventions of overseas Chinese in Bangkok shows the
international0national nature of diasporic Chinese activity in the capital that pro-
88+ See McKeown 1999, 322; and Liu 1998+
89+ Viraphon Sopha, farmers’ organizer in northeastern Thailand, in Chatniyom 2001, 26; Pasuk
and Baker 2000, 172–74; Chang Noi, “Revisiting Dark Corners of Our Political Past,” The Nation
~Bangkok!, 24 September 1997+
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duces national boundaries in new ways+ The Seventh World Huang Clan Associa-
tion Convention, held in Bangkok in December 1999, functioned quite differently
from the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention held in 1995 in Bangkok+ Rather
than gathering individual businesspeople into a transnational network, as the cos-
mopolitan diaspora narrative would suggest, the World Huang Clan Association
conference gathered national Huang clan associations+90 Indeed, the world body
was created and promoted by the Taiwanese Huang Clan Association in 1980 as
part of Taiwan’s informal diplomacy of national reunification since it was ejected
from the United Nations in 1971+91
Certainly, the World Huang Clan Association is one of the transnational bodies
that exemplify the invisible empire of the overseas Chinese+ The Huang clan even
has its own anthem that sings of bringing together brothers from around the world+
Glorious civilization is praised in familiar ways: “our country is the country of
manners+” But it is not clear whether they are referring to Chinese civilization or
Huang civilization+ While standard Chinese texts celebrate 5,000 years of glorious
Chinese civilization, the Huang clan convention program states that “for more than
4,000 years our people have not forgotten their Huang roots+” The unification of
the various peoples from ancient times is not simply to unify the motherland in
1949, but to unify the transnational Huang clan in 1980+92
But the convention also shows the intensely national nature of the association:
the Huang associations are not anti-national or postnational, but look to Thai na-
tional leaders and symbols as part of clan identity+ While World Chinese Entrepre-
neurs conventions are “patronized by prominent Chinese transnational entrepreneurs,
with the blessing of @non-Chinese# local @that is, national# political leaders,” the
World Huang Clan Association’s program makes sure to celebrate the powerful
Thai national politicians who are members of the Huang clan+93 More to the point,
the Thai organizers of the Huang convention made sure to appeal to national sym-
bols: the first page of the program has an official photograph of the Thai king and
queen+ The genealogy of illustrious Huang ancestors only comes second+ In a more
prosaic sense, the mission of each Huang association is national: the Bangkok-
based group is a charitable organization that takes care of Huang clanspeople in
Thailand+ Cosmopolitan activities are organized according to the borders of the
host nation-state+
This nationalization of clan organizations is part of the firming up of Thai bor-
ders in the past decade+ While there has been much talk about globalization break-
ing down the borders of the nation-state, since the 1980s the Thai state has been
solidifying its physical and economic borders+ Huge construction projects have
90+ See Diqijie shijie Huang shizong 1999; and Liu 1998, 586+
91+ See Callahan forthcoming ~a!, chap+ 7+
92+ See Huang Youhe in Diqijie shijie Huang shizong 1999, 16; Huang Song in Diqijie 1999, 13;
and Huang Tongqing in Diqijie 1999, 18+ Bolt and McKeown make similar points for other migrant
associations, see Bolt 2000, 31; and McKeown 1999, 326+
93+ See Liu 1998, 586; and Diqijie shijie Huang shizong 1999, 47– 48+
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spent scarce resources to build roads to clarify Thailand’s borders with Burma and
Malaysia, and embankments along the Mekong River to stabilize its riparian bor-
der with Laos+94 Likewise, years before neo-nationalism emerged in 1997, the state
has been rationalizing0nationalizing customs and immigration procedures to as-
sert central Bangkok control over the political economy+ Thailand is involved in a
global network economy+ But the main Thai node of this network is Bangkok, the
capital of the nation-state+
The cosmopolitan Chinese associations in Bangkok work according to this
international0national logic+ Here they provide evidence for standard views of over-
seas Chinese politics: Sino-Thai organizations serve as bridges between China,
Thailand, and other nation-states+95 For example, in 1998 the fifty-five clan asso-
ciations of Thailand sent letters both to the Indonesian embassy to protest the atroc-
ities against ethnic Chinese, and to the Chinese embassy to demand action for
Chinese compatriots+96 This shows how the Chinese clan associations based in
Bangkok work according to the diplomatic logic of the nation-state: even though
they represent transnational groups, they still gathered together in 1998 according
to Thai boundaries to petition the nation-states of Indonesia and the PRC+ Na-
tional clan associations thus serve as a gateway for international0national flows of
people, information, capital, and charitable relief+ They certainly take care of their
own domestic Sino-Thai constituency, but they diverge radically from Thai neo-
nationalism+ They are an international0national form of nationalism rather than a
nativist neo-nationalism+Academic analysis of overseas Chinese communities also
characteristically follows this nation-state formula: research is conducted on over-
seas Chinese society “in” Thailand, “in” Malaysia, “in” Indonesia, “in” the United
States, and so on+97 But as I have shown, cosmopolitanism is produced in the ten-
sion between nation-states in Thailand and abroad+
Diasporic Chinese in Phuket
Sino-Thai economic culture in Phuket is different from that in Bangkok+ In Bang-
kok, anti-‘Chineseness’ is a non-issue because the Chinese have mixed with the
Thai to such an extent that you cannot easily tell one from the other+ In Phuket,
neo-nationalism is not a problem because the Chinese dominate the province, con-
stituting 70 percent of the population+ Phuket is both the smallest and the richest
province in Thailand+ In this way, Phuket is a prosperous ethnic Chinese enclave
more similar to Singapore and Penang than its fellow Thai provinces of Chiang
Mai and Khon Kaen+
94+ Author’s interview with a Thai foreign ministry official, Bangkok, 15 December 2000+
95+ See Wu 1999, 1–2; and Ong 1999, 133+
96+ Author’s interview with Ah Gok Liang, Manager of the Huang Association of Thailand, Bang-
kok, 16 December 2000+
97+ Chan and Tong 2001+
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It is not a coincidence that Phuket has a similar regional economic culture to
Singapore and Penang+ The three island-cities are linked in a historic network of
Chinese migration facilitated by the European empires in Southeast Asia+ While
most of the Sino-Thai in central, northern, and northeastern Thailand came to the
kingdom via Bangkok, most came to Phuket along the “southern route” to work
in the island’s tin mines+ This itinerary joined southern China, Hong Kong, Sin-
gapore, Penang, Phuket, and southern Burma together in a circuit of diasporic
Chinese migration, trade, and culture+98 The itinerary bypassed Bangkok not for
political reasons, but because of economies of transport: until recently it took
four days to travel overland to Bangkok, while it took just sixteen hours to sail
to Penang+99
Rather than being produced in relation to the nation, diaspora was produced in
relation to the British empire, as a community of Southeast Asian overseas Chi-
nese, the Nanyang @South Seas# Chinese+100 Diasporic Chinese activities were or-
ganized more around these British imperial nodes than according to Thai national
borders+ Though mainland Chinese national historiography employs overseas Chi-
nese as an important source of anti-imperialist Chinese national identity, diasporic
Chinese were also an integral part of Western imperialism+ Another new word,
“comprador,” was coined to describe the Chinese middlemen who facilitated im-
perial governance+ Though Chinese people suffered from the opium and inden-
tured labor regimes, Chinese merchants were also key figures in the network
economy of the opium and labor trades+101 When Thai nationalism made Chinese
culture a problem in the 1940s and 1950s, it was common for ethnic Chinese from
Phuket to follow the empire’s circuits to send their children to Penang for school-
ing+ Likewise, books for Phuket’s Chinese school initially came from Penang and
Hong Kong; only later did Taiwan compete with the PRC for influence via patri-
otic nationalist education+
Phuket’s tin mines, and then its tourist industry, have located the island in a
transnational political economy since the mid-nineteenth century+ Trade was
conducted not just within the diasporic Chinese network facilitated by the
British empire, but directly with North America, Europe, and Australia+ Now, be-
cause of the consolidation of the Thai state, borders are firmer, and most trade
goes through Bangkok+ Still, the mayor of Phuket City wished to decentralize
state power from Bangkok back to Phuket to encourage both a cosmopolitan econ-
omy and good governance+ The point was not simply to join a Greater Chinese
network—most of the Hokkien Chinese majority who dominate Phuket have little
98+ The Penguin Atlas of Diasporas has a map that traces the southern route+ Curiously, it does not
list Phuket as a site on this itinerary+ See Chaliand and Rageau 1997, 131+
99+ Author’s interview with Lt+ Phummisak Hongsyok, mayor of Phuket Municipality and vice
president of the Hokkien Association, Phuket, 21 December 2000+
100+ Wang 1992, 11–39+
101+ See McKeown 1999, 316; Ngo 1999; and Trocki 1999+
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interest in mainland China—but to encourage Phuket as a node in a more trans-
national economy+102
One way to measure the strength of the Chinese community is to examine the
success of Chinese schools+ According to this method, the overseas Chinese have
been quite successful in Phuket+ The Thai-Chinese ~Thai-Hua! school celebrated
its ninetieth anniversary in 2000+ The alumni of the school are proud to note that
Thailand’s first private Chinese school was founded in Phuket, not Bangkok+ Chi-
nese education has also survived better in Phuket than in other provinces, most
probably because of Phuket’s high concentration of diasporic Chinese and their
political influence in the capital+103 While alumni are proud that their school has
survived, they are also humiliated at the school’s suffering+ The foundation of the
school in 1910 puts it firmly in the trend of the growing nationalist consciousness
among overseas Chinese+104 Yet the timing was also unfortunate: the Chinese be-
came a “problem” when the Thai monarchy was threatened by China’s 1911 re-
publican revolution+ The Thai state thus had much the same view as the various
Chinese regimes: overseas Chinese schools were seen as centers of political influ-
ence+ The Thai state needed to control such activity, and hence Chinese schools
were either closed down or closely regulated+
Like overseas Chinese history more generally, the school’s ninety-year history
is hardly stable: it has opened and closed again and again, changing its name sev-
eral times+ Initially it was called the Zhonghua ~Chinese! School, and when it was
reopened in 1948 it was called the Thai-Hua ~Thai-Chinese! School+ It was seen
as a threat to Thai nationalism in the Phibul era ~1938– 44 and 1948–57!, and as a
communist threat during the Sarit-Thanom-Prapas era ~1959–73!+Alumni told how
during the 1930s and 1950s, when students heard a state inspector coming, they
had to burn their Chinese books+ As with diasporic Chinese in general, the humil-
iation suffered in Phuket was not an epic humiliation of the Chinese nation, but
day-to-day harassment+ As control of Chinese education was only liberalized in
1992, memories of anti-Chinese policies are still fresh+105 Even though respon-
dents at the Thai-Hua School did not take the threat of neo-nationalism seriously,
their history of humiliation and suffering made them wary+ They wanted their re-
marks reported anonymously, which suggests that they still fear that Thai nation-
alism entails anti-Chinese activity+
Chinese schools are not just for educating children, but like the clan association
examined in Bangkok, they are a center of community activity+ Two other centers
for community activity in Phuket are the Chinese temples and Rotary0Lions clubs+
The Chinese temple in Phuket is especially noteworthy, as it is at the center of the
world-renowned Vegetarian Festival+ It draws many tourists from the West, but
102+ Author’s interview with a small businessman, Phuket, 28 December 2000; Author’s interview
with Lt+ Phummisak Hongsyok, Phuket, 21 December 2000+
103+ Author’s interview with Thai-Hua School alumni, Phuket, 21 December 2000+
104+ Wang 1992, 40+
105+ See Thirakruek phiti 1999, 93; and Kasian 1997, 95+
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the Festival is also part of a pilgrimage circuit for ethnic Chinese believers+ Hence
diasporic Chinese relations are reversed+ Here, the Sino-Thai are not sojourners
who long to return to China+ Connections between Phuket’s Kathu temple and
temples on mainland China are very weak+ The main relationship is with a Chi-
nese temple in Malaysia that was founded in 1850 as an offshoot of the Kathu
temple+ This was only rediscovered in 1993, when the president of the Taiping
temple in Malaysia traced its origins back to Phuket+ Hence rather than home-
coming being directed at hometowns in China, as standard overseas Chinese nar-
ratives state, here the center is in Phuket+106 Sino-Thai in Phuket are not pseudo-
Chinese in need of reeducation in ‘Chineseness’ by the PRC, but a source of
Chinese culture that is produced in relation to nodes of transnational activity in
Southeast Asia+
Similar regional communities have been formed via petit bourgeois social
clubs+ Though the Rotary and Lions clubs are both midwestern in origin, they
have a very loyal following in Southeast Asia that is largely, if not exclusively,
overseas Chinese+ As with schools and temples, most of the networking is not
with China or Taiwan, but among neighboring Southeast Asian nations+107
Their solidarity is with compatriots in Malaysia and Indonesia+ Even so, it is
not like Thai neo-nationalism that looks to Mahathir as an anti-Western ally+ It
was clear from interviews that the solidarity is with fellow ethnic Chinese who
gather against a perceived Islamic threat exemplified by Malaysian and Indone-
sian society+
The Phuket experience shows how overseas Chinese still engage in transna-
tional networks, often in conflict with the central government in Bangkok and neo-
nationalist ideology+ These transnational networks have grown out of a Nanyang
Chinese economic culture fostered by the British empire, which persists in post-
colonial Southeast Asia+ But as the major civic institutions of Phuket—the Chi-
nese school, the temple, and the petit bourgeois social clubs—show, these networks
are not closely linked with China+ Rather, they are involved in transnational mi-
crocircuits of education, pilgrimage, and conventioneering within Southeast Asia,
especially with Chinese communities just over the border in Malaysia+ As they
cross national borders, they produce new communities not just in distinction to
states, but as part of a relation of Chinese and Islamic economic cultures+ Thus
cosmopolitan Chinese groups in Phuket are not evidence of a “third culture” that
is independent of nationalism+ The diaspora takes on meaning in regional net-
works of economic culture rather than in either homogeneous national communi-
ties or a coherent cosmopolitan culture+
106+ Nangsue thi raruk sanchao 1996, 12; Author’s interview with Chaiyooth Pinpradab, vice pres-
ident of the Kathu Temple, Phuket, 19 December 2000+ In Thai, “sanjao-Chinese temple” means a
Daoist rather than a Buddhist temple+
107+ Author’s interview with Officers of the Hokkien Association of Phuket, Phuket, 25 December
2000; author’s interview with Chaiyooth Pinpradab, Kathu, Phuket, 19 December 2000+
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Diasporic Chinese in Mahasarakham
The Sino-Thai situation in the rural northeastern province of Mahasarakham is in
many ways the opposite of that in Phuket+ It is involved in neither a national nor a
transnational economic culture, but as I show, it takes shape in relation to out-
siders from other provinces+ The community is small+ It is one of the poorest
provinces in the country+ Though Chinese have been in the area for nearly two
centuries—first settling in the neighboring province of Roi-Et in 1836—not much
is going on in Mahasarakham+ The Chinese school lasted only from 1944 to 1949,
when it was shut down by the state+ Clan associations are absent; interested Sino-
Thai have to go to the closest city, Khon Kaen—likewise for the Rotary and Lions
clubs+108
The main “Chinese” institution in the province is called the Mahasarakham As-
sociation, and it was founded relatively recently, in 1982+ Unlike the Thai-Hua
school in Phuket, this Association has not had to struggle for recognition from the
state+ Quite the opposite: it was the state that instructed the local Sino-Thai com-
munity to found the association to celebrate the ruling Chakri dynasty’s bicenten-
nial+ Diasporic organizations thus were formed at the provincial level to legitimate
royal nationalism+ Strangely, the Chinese committee of Mahasarakham decided to
name the association and its building after its Thai province rather than anything
Chinese or royalist+
Unlike Phuket, Mahasarakham is not part of any transnational network—except
if one counts the communist insurgency that raged in the region up into the 1980s,
and was led by Sino-Thai+ It would be hard to argue that Mahasarakham is even
part of a national network, because the railroad and superhighway both bypass
the province+ The most cosmopolitan aspect of the province is the University of
Mahasarakham, which forms a strong cultural center for the community+ ~Phuket,
with all its wealth and influence, still lacks a university+! Business in Mahasarakham,
on the other hand, is local+ It is almost exclusively trade and commerce: there is
no industry in the province+ The most prominent Sino-Thai owns the Toyota dealer-
ship+ A past president of the Mahasarakham Association is a shopkeeper who sells
picture frames+ Sino-Thai business is generally represented by the Chamber of
Commerce, which has the same membership as the Mahasarakham Association;
that is, it is ethnic Chinese+ The diaspora’s limited “economic horizon” in Mahasa-
rakham, that focuses on trade rather than manufacturing, is common among pro-
vincial business in Thailand’s remote northeastern region+109
Sino-Thai life, as with life in general in Mahasarakham, is best described as
“provincial” in both the geographical and the critical sense+ The mission state-
ment of the Mahasarakham Association underlines this:
108+ Niranam 1993, 9; author’s interview with Nareerat Parisuthiwuttiporn, history lecturer at the
University of Mahasarakham, Mahasarkham, 8 August 2001; author’s interview with Thasaanachan
Phumiphan, Mahasarakham, 9 August 2001+
109+ See Nareerat 2000, 6; and Ueda 2000, 181+
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The objectives of the association are: to be a meeting place for the Mahasa-
rakham people, to create unity among the Mahasarakham people, to support
secure jobs for Mahasarakham people, to be the intermediary between gov-
ernment officials and the people, and to promote education, sports, religion,
and traditional customs+110
Such provincial capitalism, which was dominated by Sino-Thai business, was one
of the keys to the successful Thai political economy before 1997+ But a recent
controversy testifies to the parochial nature of the economic culture in Mahasara-
kham as it is constructed in relation to outsiders+ In 2001, the Chamber of Com-
merce was agitated because its members were being undersold by extra-provincial
caravan traders+ Competition from these outsiders was driving the Mahasarakham
traders out of business; the outsiders’ prices were lower because they did not have
to pay local taxes+
Rather than promoting a transnational network and a liberal trade regime as in
Phuket, Sino-Thai business in Mahasarakham organized demonstrations to protest
against a national free market+111 Globalization was not the problem here, so much
as any national economy—Sino-Thai business demanded that the provincial gov-
ernor restrict interprovincial trade and enforce a Mahasarakham mercantilism+ The
irony is that overseas Chinese used the caravan trade in the nineteenth century to
penetrate markets in northeastern Thailand+ Such an anti-entrepreneurial attitude
among the diasporic Chinese is one reason why Mahasarakham is not as prosper-
ous as its neighbors+ Sino-Thai in Mahasarakham are wary of investing money,
and prefer to deposit it in banks—none of which are based in the province+112
Sino-Thai in Mahasarakham thus show how diasporic Chinese adapt to and de-
velop local economic culture+ In this way, they are the only diasporic Chinese
interviewed by the author in Thailand who correspond with Bangkok’s neo-
nationalist mercantilism thematically, if not in terms of content+ They see outsid-
ers as immoral competition and wish to construct and guard economic borders+
They complain that the system is unfair and see the problem as more political
than economic+ The government—in this case, the governor and mayor—is either
too weak to defend their interests, or has shown its corrupt nature by selling out
the province to outsiders+ The province is an economic backwater—even when
compared with its neighbor Roi-Et, let alone Bangkok or Phuket—and successful
overseas Chinese traders reflect this very narrow view of business+ Rather than
being evidence of an invisible empire of diasporic Chinese entrepreneurs who con-
stitute the third largest economy in the world, or of a neo-national economic cul-
ture, this group of businesspeople is simply trying to keep the caravan traders out+
Once again, the diaspora is necessary for producing economic and cultural bor-
110+ Niranam 1993, 12, 10+
111+ Author’s interview with Thasaanachan Phumiphan, Mahasarakham, 9 August 2001+
112+ Author’s interview with Thavesilp Subwattana, History Professor at the University of Mahasa-
rakham, Mahasarakham, 10 August 2001+
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ders in Mahasarakham+ Its community takes shape against the mobile and flexible
capitalism of the extra-provincial caravan traders+
The fieldwork recounted in this section certainly demonstrates the diversity of
Sino-Thai experience—sometimes national, other times transnational, and still oth-
ers provincial—and how it is formed in distinction to a set of Others: for example,
anti-Indonesian in Bangkok, anti-Muslim in Phuket, and anti-caravan trader in Ma-
hasarakham+ But one can generalize from this analysis+ In all three sites, Sino-
Thai are not at the periphery of either Thai or Chinese economic culture+ They are
not the sojourners of old who defined themselves in terms of China’s standards of
civilization, or immigrants who have assimilated to Thai nationalism+ Rather, these
groups are busy networking for three particular forms of capitalism: international,
transnational, and provincial+ The key to understanding their activity is that they
are all networking in similar ways: constructing diasporic identities against differ-
ence encountered in their specific contexts+ Hence, diasporic identity in Thailand
functions in similar ways to national identity: it is not a culture of shared norms,
so much as a set of common differences defined by particular economic-cultural
contexts+
The fieldwork helps one to question cosmopolitanism: none of these three dias-
poras is evidence of an autonomous “third culture” of Sino-Thai identity that “seeks
opportunities elsewhere+” Rather than being flexible and mobile, as Nonini and
Ong argue, these three ethnographies show how the diaspora is flexible but not
necessarily mobile+ Thus research that points to the fluid cosmopolitanism of di-
aspora only applies to the limited case of wealthy “transnational yuppies+” Rather
than being a transformative force for a new style of globalization, evidence shows
that diasporic Chinese adapt to particular economic contexts+ Rather than seeking
opportunities elsewhere, they creatively respond to and develop opportunities in
context+ They are very successful at colonizing and shaping particular economic
cultures: international0national capitalism in Bangkok, transnational capitalism in
Phuket, and provincial capitalism in Mahasarakham+ They are not nationalist in
Phuket or Mahasarakham simply because most of the international0national eco-
nomic opportunities are concentrated in the Bangkok area; they are less cosmo-
politan in Bangkok than expected for the same reason: it is the national economic
node+ Diasporas thus are not the pure agency of mobile capital, but flexibly re-
spond to specific economic-cultural contexts—in predictable ways, related to re-
lations of difference+
Though Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink lament that there are “few full-fledged
transnational movements,” I think that the diasporic communities examined in this
article are worthy of their consideration+113 But rather than just looking to global
civil society to see how transnational nongovernmental organizations construct
113+ Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002, 8+ As charitable organizations and educational founda-
tions, many of the institutions of the diasporic public sphere would fit into standard definitions of
NGO activity ~see 6–7!+
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shared international norms, one also has to examine the specific localities of the
diasporic public sphere’s clan associations, temples, schools, and petit bourgeois
social clubs+ Rather than referring to the universals of human rights and democ-
racy to guide and legitimate political activity, the transnational politics of dias-
pora take shape in contextual relations between identity and difference as they
produce social, economic, and cultural borders+ Just as with the mutual construc-
tion of diasporic and national identity in China and Thailand, the main point is not
the cultural content of the identity, but the relations of exclusion that produce it+
Hence to understand diasporic politics in Thailand, one needs to do more than
chart out the specifics of each particular experience in Bangkok, Phuket, and Ma-
hasarakham+ Rather than each being a prime example of nationalist, cosmopoli-
tan, and local identity—as expected—the ethnographies show how economic and
social activity is produced in a common logic of difference+ Though the content of
each economic culture is different in the three sites, the form of identity formation
via exclusion is the same+ The evidence shows how identity is produced through
constructing borders of self and Other, not just for the most obvious case of na-
tional identity, but in relations of exclusion in local and transnational contexts as
well+
Conclusion
Globalization does not simply describe a process whereby Western capitalism and
American popular culture dominate the world, and erode both state sovereignty
and local culture+ This article has shown how Chinese capitalism and culture have
been key in building borders and producing communities+ But rather than substi-
tuting “Chinese” for “American” to describe this process, I have used diaspora to
question popular understandings of the global versus the local to argue that cos-
mopolitanism and nationalism produce each other in relations of norms and dif-
ference+ Hence, diasporas not only loosen any essential link between nation and
state but also illuminate the informal politics of the relation between the global
and the local+
Though diasporic Chinese capitalism is often figured as a peculiarly Asian
form of globalization that erodes national borders in Southeast Asia, I have shown
how diasporic populations are intimately involved in defining borders+ The evi-
dence has shown how neo-nationalism in China and Thailand shares a similar logic:
a highly territorialized identity, an economic-cultural understanding of neo-
imperialism, and an Othering of the West+ Both have a strong notion of National
Humiliation that relies on a foreign0domestic dynamic: foreign invasion aided by
domestic stupidity and corruption+ Both have used diasporic Chinese as a resource
to construct a nationalist self and a foreign Other+ Though Thai nationalism has
been constructed against a Chinese Other in the past, now neo-nationalism not
only includes Sino-Thai but is largely formulated by them+ Yet fieldwork shows
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how many Sino-Thai in the provinces still figure Thai nationalism as an anti-
Chinese activity and are suspicious about its morality and practicality+
The analysis also questioned how nationalism and cosmopolitanism are formu-
lated by arguing against the popular notion of diasporic Chinese as a cosmo-
politan community+ The ethnographies both added to and problematized critical
considerations of diaspora by examining the diversity of ‘Chineseness’ as it is ar-
ticulated in different economic-cultural spaces in Thailand+ Fieldwork in Bang-
kok, Phuket, and Mahasarakham demonstrated that ethnic Chinese populations do
not simply constitute a third culture+ Though internally coherent to people in Bang-
kok, Phuket, and Mahasarakham, each ethnography called the others into ques-
tion, adding to our critical view of national identity+ Diaspora thus both constructs
and deconstructs the dynamic of nationalism and cosmopolitanism+ Rather than
assimilating to Thai nationalism, diasporic Chinese are involved in colonizing the
prevailing economic culture, be it national, transnational, or provincial+ It is note-
worthy that on the one hand, many of the Bangkok elite who write neo-nationalist
manifestos are Sino-Thai, and on the other hand, a provincial diasporic Chinese
institution is called the “Mahasarakham” Association+ Examining the transna-
tional politics of diaspora is thus helpful, as this group is often seen as “social
problem” by states because it does not fit into normative notions of territory and
identity+ A sociological approach, for example, which examines national identity
in terms of shared norms and institutions, would have missed this economic-
cultural dynamic+
The analysis thus has theoretical import beyond the “exotic East+” As stated
above, one obvious conclusion to draw would be that the diversity of diasporic
economic cultures evades generalization as an example of either empiricism or
relativism+ Neither is the argument of this article+ Quite the opposite: generaliza-
tions are possible, but one has to look in different places+ To understand how na-
tionalism and cosmopolitanism, the global and the local work, one needs to see
how the outsiders, such as the diaspora, are necessary for constructing communi-
ties and producing boundaries+ Diasporas, thus are not just an economic resource,
but a symbolic resource in the economic cultures of cosmopolitanism, national-
ism, and localism+ To argue this, I have built on sociological constructivism’s ex-
amination of identity and norms+ Certainly, there are considerable overlaps between
sociological and anthropological constructivism; but the distinction is also impor-
tant+ By focusing research on the search for cultural norms, sociological construc-
tivism is unable to get beyond the assimilation0multiculturalism debate that limits
diaspora studies+ A sociological approach, for example, might look for common
Asian norms to explain the similarities between Chinese and Thai neo-nationalism+
But rather than looking to culture as a substance that has content, I have shown
how anthropological constructivism highlights how culture takes shape in context-
sensitive relations between identity and difference+ The article has shown that what
China and Thailand share is not a common identity, but a common set of
differences—in this case, diasporic Chinese and Western imperialism—against
which their particular national identities are constructed+
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By shifting the research agenda from norms to difference, we are better able to
consolidate sociological constructivism’s anti-essentialist view of identity and un-
derstand the complexities of transnational politics+A future research agenda would
trace how this logic of identity and exclusion applies beyond the cases of China
and Thailand to the relations of difference between other nations and other dias-
poras+ As mentioned in the introduction, the Islamic diaspora in Europe is inti-
mately involved in producing recent neo-nationalisms in France, England, Germany,
and the Netherlands+ Jewish, Irish, and South Asian diasporas are likewise impor-
tant elements in various nationalisms around the world+ In this way, diaspora re-
search is part of the movement in IR from a tight focus on “inter-national,” to an
attention to “relations”—the relational nature of identity+
To address these issues, IR theory needs to better explore the questions of eco-
nomic culture thus far raised mostly by historians and anthropologists+ IR scholars
could add expertise in norms, states, and regimes to this crossover discipline that
combines cultural analysis and IPE to examine the politics of transnational flows
of people, cultural practices, and capital+ IR theory would also have to take more
seriously the politics of Otherness+ It is not a coincidence that the most
compelling transnational social movements, especially since Seattle 1999, do not
describe themselves normatively according to what they are for, but counter-
normatively according to what they oppose: anti-globalization, anti-capitalism, anti-
American in Europe, and anti-West in the rest of the world+ The modalities of
these transnational social movements also appeal to Otherness and counter-
normative opposition: nongovernmental organization and nonviolent action+114 To
understand such transnational politics, it is necessary to more closely examine the
politics of difference to see how it shapes these important nonstate movements+
This article has used the peculiar example of the Chinese diaspora to start an
examination of these larger political issues+ As the empirical evidence demon-
strated, diaspora are not simply an “ethnic problem+” They are key in the construc-
tion and deconstruction of the seemingly opposite ideologies of nationalism and
cosmopolitanism+ Diaspora thus not only adds new data to arguments about global0
local relations+ It helps one question the structures of world politics that look to
the opposition between cosmopolitanism and nationalism+
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